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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
Case No.

vs.

12548

BENNETT MERL BEL"\i\TOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for violation
of Section 76-30-1 and 3 Utah Code Annotated (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried in the District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding, and found guilty of Murder in the First
Degree.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant prays that the judgment of the lower
Court be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about 3 :00 p.m. on July 9, 1970, in the vicinity known as Big Hollow Canyon on the north side of
Clover Creek off the Dugway Road in the County of
Tooele, State of Utah, Peter K. Smith and Howard
Warr discovered a body later identified as Ronald Paul
Smith. The defendant, Bennett .Merle Belwood, on
Wednesday, July 8, 1970, had spent the early evening
hours driving up and down the streets of Tooele and
drinking beer in the company of Ronald Paul Smith. At
I :30 a.m., the defendant and Ronald Paul Smith went
to the home of the co-defendant Ruth Breece and obtained a small 22-caliber pistol to be used for deer hunting. The defendant Ruth Breece accompanied the defendant and Ronald Paul Smith to Dugway for the purpose of the defendant presenting a compensat10n claim
and to do some hunting and shooting. Sometime between
3.30 a.m. and 6 :00 a.m., Ronald Paul Smith was shot
twice-once in the back of the head and once in the face
near the nose.
A warrant of arrest and complaint were signed by
Sheriff Fay Gillette before the Honorable M. Earl Marshall on the 10th day of July, 1970. Sheriff Gillette flew
to Flaming Gorge, the co-defendants and companions
2

having been taken into custody by officers pursuant to a
telephonic communication of the warrant of arrest at
approximately 5 :00 p.m. The defendants were taken to
the Uintah County jail in Vernal, Utah, and there transported to Tooele, Utah, arriving at approximately 1 :30
a.m. on the 11th day of July, 1970. The defendants were
segregated, one being interned in the Tooele City Jail
and one being interned in the Tooele County Jail. Sheriff Gillette seized the defendant's red Ford Falcon in the
late afternoon of the 10th day of July, and physically
drove it to the Tooele County shops located behind the
Tooele County courthouse and parked it. At approximately 12 :30 p.m. on July 11, 1970, Fay Gillette appeared before Judge M. Earl Marshall and secured a
search warrant of the vehicle. The defendant herein was
arraigned at 3 :00 p.m. on Monday, July 13, 1970.

POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING
THE PROSECUTOR TO EXCEED THE
SCOPE OF DIRECT EXAMINATION IN
CROSS-EXAMINING THE
DEFENDANT,
BELWOOD.
The defendant was called to testify in his own behalf
at the opening of defendant's case. He testified on pages
554 through 556 of the transcript only to certain limited
matters. These related to his consumption of alcohol and
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drugs on the day on which the murder was alleged to
have been committed, to his prior history in mental institutions, and of drug use. He in no way entered into a
discussion of the facts surrounding the alleged murder,
nor did he attempt in any way to negative any of the
allegations against him. He was called by his counsel
for foundational purposes only.
After eliciting on direct examination sufficient information to allow the defense's second witness to answer
hypotheticals, the defendant was released for crossexamination. The prosecutor cross examined briefly
about the drugs which defendant had taken and the
alcohol which he had consumed and his past history in
connection with mental hospitals. On line 24 of the transcript at page 561, the prosecution asked a question
about an occurrence on the evening of the alleged
murder. Counsel for the defendant objected on the
grounds that it went beyond the scope of direct examination. This objection was erroneously overruled. Subsequently, the prosecution proceeded to cross examine
wth respect to all of the occurrences of the night in question over defense counsel's repeated objections. On
page 564 of the transcript, defense counsel asked to be
heard at the bench and out of hearing of the jury and
this discussion was had:
Mr. Van Seiver: the reason I have put on a
very limited direct is because I have to have that
as a foundation, and I don't think that by asking
him what hospitals he's been in and how much
he has had to drink and how much valium he had

4

permits Mr. Banks to go through the whole evening all over again, and exactly what's going to
happen if he's [the defendantj going to sit up
there and
to deny things. That's going
to hurt us m front of the jury. This goes way
beyond the scope of direct.
The Court then allowed defense counsel a continuing objection but continued erroneously to permit the
prosecution to pursue this course of cross-examination.
The most cursory reading of the cross-examination will
clearly show that the objectionable questions and the
answers required by the Court and given by the defendant were prejudicial.
77-44-2 Utah Code (1963) states:

The rules of evidence in civil actions shall be
al.so to criminal actions, except as
otherwise provided in this code.
77 -44-5 Utah Code Ann. ( 1963) provides:

If a defendant offers himself as a witness, he
may be cross-examined by the counsel for the
state the same as any other witness. His neglect
or refusal to be a witnesse shall not in any manner
prejudice him or be used against him on the trial
or proceeding.
These two code provisions, together with the Federal and State Constitutional privileges against selfincrimination delimit the boundaries of cross-examination when the accused takes the witness stand.
The above provisions were examined and construed
m STATE V. VANCE, 38 Utah 1, llO Pac. 434
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(1910). In that case, the defendant was charged under

three different counts of murdering his wife. One count
charged that he beat, kicked, and otherwise injured the
defendant with his hands and feet, causing her death;
another was that he caused her death by poison; and
the third count was that he caused her death by a combination of beating, kicking, and poison. The defendant
took the stand and testified only to the extent of denying
or negating that portion of the indictment which alleged
a murder by poison. In his examination in chief, he
denied that he dropped a tablet of poison into the deceased's drinking water as the State's evidence would
tend to infer. The defendant on his direct examination
made no mention of any of the alleged beatings, nor of
subsequent conversations about the alleged beatings.
He made no attempt to explain, modify, negate or refer
to the beatings at all. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked numerous questions about these matters.
Over objection, the Court forced defendant to answer
these questions about the beatings, and he did so by
denying them. The Court noted that the test required
by the code sections heretofore referred to was:
Would the particular question be proper crossexamination if the same were propounded to
any other witness who had testified to the same
facts that the accused had testified to? 110 Pac.
at 445.
The Court explained that if the accused has made
certain admissions or has made statements of material
fact against himself, then everything which contradicts,
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modifies, explains, clarifies, limits, or enlarges the meaning of the statements made by him, may be inquired
into on cross-examination. "The inquiry must, however,
be limited to the subject matter gone into by the witness
in his testimony in chief." no Pac. 445. Observing that
where the accused as a witness denies that he committed
or was connected with the commission of the acts
charged, cross-examination is necessarily very broad,
the court continued:
But where, as in the case at bar, the witness
limits his statements to negating or explaining
mere isolated facts, or merely states what occurred at a particular time and place, then what took
place ordinarily constitutes the subject matter
upon which the witness testified and the crossexamination should be limited to that subject.
no Pac. 445.
All questions asked of the defendant except those
which referred to beating and bruising >vere found to
be proper questions. But the trial court's allowance of
the testimony about beatings was error. The court stated:
Appellant had neither directly nor indirectly
denied nor in any way negated his connection
with the beating. He left the subject untouched
in his examination in chief. The subject therefore
was not opened up for cross-examination. llO
Pac. 445.
Anticipating the argument and relying on STATE
V. SHOCKLEY, 29 Utah 25, 88 Pac. 865 (1905), the
Court ruled the questions which went beyond the scope
of direct examination could not be sustained on the
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theory that they were proper as affecting the defendant's credibility or the weight that should be given to
his testimony. The Court went on to discuss the two
rules surrounding testimony of a defendant who takes
the stand as a witness. It acknowledged that one rule
holds, once the stand is taken, the privilege is waived
and the defendant is open to cross-examination on any
subject. But the better rule and the weight of authority
holds that a defendant who takes the stand waives his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination only
as matters to the extent about which he testifies in chief.
Thus, it is clear from the statutes above cited and
the VANCE and SHOCKLEY cases that the defendant waives the privilege against self-incrimination
only as to such matters as he brings out on his direct
examination. In the case at bar, defendant testified
about mental institutions that he had been in, and pills
and alcohol he had consumed on the day in question.
As a result, only these areas were opened to cross-examination. The defendant did not deny, explain, nor negate
any of the state's case in chief. He left this field untouched. The Court allowed the prosecutor over objection of defense counsel to open this area and go thoroughly through it. Under VANCE, this is reversible error.
In addition, it could not be argued that the error
thus committed by the trial court was not prejudicial.
The defendant was forced to deny many of the questions
asked by the prosecutor. A number of discrepancies in
his testimony appeared and many of his answers were
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hazy and gave the appearance of one attempting to
cover damaging material. These questions and answers
inevitably had an adverse e:ff ect on the jury.
Thus, it is clear that the Court erred in allowing
the prosecutor to go beyond the direct examination in
its cross-examination of defendant, and it is equally
clear that that cross-examination was fatally damaging
to defendant. As a result, the defendant urges that his
conviction be reversed.

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED ERROR
WHEN IT EXCUSED PROSPECTIVE JUROR
NUMBER TWENTY-TWO :FOR CAUSE BECAUSE OF HER OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT.
Because the error committed by the court in excusing for cause a prospective juror based on her belief
about capital punishment is of constitutional dimension,
the relevant voir dire examination is crucial to a determination of the issue. Therefore, it will be set out in
full.
MR. BANKS: I would like to ask each member
of the jury panel if any of you have any qualms
about returning a verdict of guilty of murder
in the first degree without a recommendation,
if the case justified it, other than the three I have
interviewed individually?
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THE COURT: If you feel you would have such
qualms, raise your hands please.
MRS. MAASS: I have the same opinion asTHE COURT: That's .Mrs. :Maass, No. 22?
MRS. :MAASS: Yes.
MR. BAN KS : I'll ask you, are you opposed to
capital punishment?
MRS. MAASS: Yes.
MR. BANKS: In any instance, can you see
where a death penalty would be justified?
MR. VAN SCIVER: That's not proper. You
can ask her if she would impose it in certain cases,
and if she would regard a type of case as being
one, but you can't force her to admit that she
would never impose it.
THE COURT: The question may stand. \\That's
your answer?
MR. BANKS: I asked you if you were opposed
to capital punishment?
MRS. MAASS: Maybe I should say that I'm
opposed to it, if I don't believe in it ...
MR. BANKS: Now, I'll ask you if you would
always return a recommendation of leniency if
you believed the defendant to be guilty of murder
in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt?
MRS. MAASS: I guess I couldn't make the
opinion until I've heard the facts.
MR. BANKS: I take it, then, in some instances
you could see where the death penalty would be
justified, is that correct?
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lVIRS. MAASS: Yes.
THE CO GR T: ':\That's her answer?
MR. BANKS: She said yes.
_ I'll ask you, with your attitude on capital punishment, would it ever prevent you from returning a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, even though you believed the evidence supported such a charge?
MRS. l\IAASS: Could be, I would recommend
leniency.
MR. BANKS: I'm not asking you whether you
would recommend leniency. I'm asking you if
your attitude on capital punishment is such that
you couldn't return a verdict of guilty of murder
in the first degree, whether it's with a recommendation or without a recommendation, even
though you believed the evidence supported such
a charge?
MRS. MAASS: Well, possibly.
MR. BANKS: Let me ask you this. Knowing
that the judge may not follow the recommendation of leniency, based on your attitude towards
death, would you be inclined to return a verdict
of murder in the second degree rather than a
verdict of guilty of
in the first degree,
even though you believed that the evidence
showed a defendant to be guilty of murder in
the first degree?
MRS. lVIAASS: Well, I don't think so.
THE COURT: Would you give us a more complete sentence, so we can tell what you mean?
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MRS. MAASS :I guess I'm a little bit confused
on this, could you repeat the question again?
MR. BANKS: I'll try to make it a little simpler.
If you believed that the evidence showed a defendant to be guilty of murder in the first degree
beyond a reasonable doubt, and you knew that
the judge might not follow a recommendation of
leniency, rather than returning a verdict of guilty
of murder in the first degree, would you return
a verdict of gulty of murder in the second degree
because you knew that that took it out of the
judge's hands?
MRS. MAASS: Yes.
MR. BANKS: I'll challenge the witness, the
juror, for cause, your honor.
THE COURT: Do you want to make an objection?
MR. VAN SCIVER: Yes, I'll except.
THE COURT: You're excused, Mrs. Maass,
thank you. ( T 59-62) .
IN WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS, 391 U.S.
510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 ( 1968), the Supreme Court held that the death penalty could not be
upheld where it was imposed or recommended by a jury
that was chosen by excluding for cause veniremen simply
because they voiced general objections to the death
penalty or expressed religious or conscientious scruples
against its infliction. The Court went on to say, 20 L.Ed.
2d at 785, fn. 21, that the most that can re required
is that the venireman be willing to consider all penalties
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and that he not be irrevocably committed before trial,
lo vote against the death penalty regardless of the
and circumstances that might emerge. If the voir dire
shows exclusion on a basis broader than this, the death
sentence cannot be carried out. Further,
Nothing ... bears upon the power of a State
to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a
jury from which the only veniremen who were
in fact excluded for cause were those who made
it unmistakeably clear ( 1) that they would
AUTOl\IATICALLY vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to
any evidence that might be developed at the trial
of the case before them, or ( 2) that their attitude
toward the death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilty. 20 L.Ed. 2d at 785, fn.21.
Thus, it is clear that those who say they would
never inflict the death penalty can be excluded, as can
those who say their views would prevent them from
making an impartial decision as to guilt, if such views are
made "unmistakably clear." Further, as the Court
held in BOULDEN V. HOLMAN, 394 U.S. 478,
89 S. Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed. 2d 443, ( 1969), it is clear that
unless a
venireman states unambiguously that he would
automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial
reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that that 1s
his position. 22 L. Ed. 2d Ct. 438.
Thus in WITHERSPOON, the Court reversed
'
the sentence, not the conviction, and held that to execute
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a man sentenced by such a jury would be depriving a
man of his life without due process of law. The same
rule was also applied in MAXWELL V. BISHOP,
398 U.S. 262, 90 S. Ct. 1578, 26 L. Ed 2d 221 (1970).
See also, generally, comment, 1969 Utah L.R. 154.
Numerous state court cases have dealt with the
problem since WITHERSPOON was decided, and
indicate that a high standard is involved and the requirements of that case are very exacting. In PEOPLE
V. CHACON, 69 Cal.2d 715, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447
P.2d 106 (19683, the excluded venireman replied, "I
don't think so" when asked if he could impose the death
penalty. The exclusion of the venireman on that basis
required reversal of the penalty imposed. In PEOPLE
V. VAUGHN, 78 Cal. Rptr. 780, 455 P. 2d (1969),
the court held that the juror did not make it "unmistakably clear" that she would automatically vote against
the death penalty. She stated, "I really feel that I object
so strongly that I couldn't consider the death penalty."
Further, she was asked, "'Vould it be fair to say that
under no circumstances would you impose the death
penalty il1 any kind of situation that could be brought
before you?" She replied as follows: "Not being able
to think of enough cases, I can't say for sure, but I
certainly can't think of one myself right now in which
I could possibly impose a death penalty." The voir dire
was quite long, and the Court pointed out that twice
the juror indicated she could vote for the death penalty
if the evidence supporting it were very good. Four
times she said she would not automatically vote against
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the death penalty. The Court held that there was adequate possibility left open that in some cases she could
impose the death penalty, and reversed the death penalty
that had been invoked by the juror. The California
Court in PEOPLE Y. 'VASHINGTON, 21 Cal.2d
1170, 81 Cal.Rptr. 5, 459 P .2d 259 ( 1969), held that
a reversal of the penalty phase was required where the
venireman had indicated that, "I would be hesitant to
vote for a death penalty." Another example of error
in excluding for cause a venireman and resulting in
a reversal of the imposed death sentence is PEOPLE
V. SCHADER, 71 Cal.2d 761, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457
P.2d 841 (1969). There, the following voir dire took
place.
A. I'm afraid I would be prejudiced. I have a
very strong opinion on the death penalty.
Q. Are you opposed to the death penalty?

A. I do.
Q. That is a conscientious opinion?
A. Quite conscientious. It's something that's very

old.

The court held that this did not make it "unmistakably clear" that she would automatically vote against
the death penalty without regard to the evidence that
might be developed or that her attitude would prevent
her from impartially determing guilt. Only one venireman was excused for cause under this procedure, yet
the California Supreme Court held that reversal of
the death penalty that was invoked was required.
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A hypothetical case involving the killing of the
President and his entire family was put to a venireman
in PEOPLE V. O'BRIEN, 71 C. 2d 394, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 313, 456, P.2d 969 (1969). The venireman, in
reply to the question of whether he could vote for the
death penalty in the hypothetical case put to him, said,
"no, I don't see what the point would be." The Court
held that, even in such a strong case, this was not evidance that made it "unmistakably clear" that he could
not invoke the death penalty. In PEOPLE V. RISENHOOVER, 70 Cal. 2d 39, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533, 447 P 2d
925 ( 1968) , the Court held that where the venireman
was interrupted by the Court in answering questions
about his attitude toward capital punishment, the partial answers that were indicated in the record were not
sufficient to show that WITHERSPOON had been
complied with.
Appellant contends that in light of such cases, as
those above cited, it is clear that prospective juror
number 22, Mrs. Maass, was wrongly excluded for cause.
Under the two part \VITHERSPOON test, it must be
made
unmistakable clear that ( 1) they would AUTOMA TI CALLY vote against the imposition of
the death penalty without regard to any evidence
that might be developed at the trial of the case
before them, or (2) that their attitude toward
the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's

guilt.

16

It is clear that the first part of this cannot be relied
upon to uphold the exclusion of Mrs. Maass. She indicated clearly that there coud be instances where the death
penalty would be justified, ( T. 60) . As to whether she
made it "unmistakebly clear" that her attitude about the
death penalt would prevent her from making an impartial determination of guilt, it is equally clear that
this cannot be relied upon to uphold her exclusion for
cause.
first asked if her attitude would prevent
her from returning a verdict of first degree murder,
if the evidence supported such a verdict, Mrs. Maass
clearly was confused as to what the question meant
and answered that she would recommend leniency. ( T.
60, 61). Upon being asked again, she indicated that
that would be possible. (T. 61). The third time around,
in a slightly different form, the question was put and
she said that she didn't think so, ( T. 61), that is, didn't
think she would return a lesser verdict to take it out
of the judge's hands. The Court then asked for a clarification, and Mrs. Maass stated that she guessed she
was confused a bit. The question was repeated and
she answered yes, (T. 61, 62). Appellant contends that
such a record indicates anything but that it was "unmistakably clear" that Mrs. Maass' attitude about the
death penalty would prevent her from an impartial
decision as to guilt. She gave really four different
answers to substantially the same question, that question
basically being whether her attitude as to capital punishment would cause her to return a verdict of somethin(I'
other than murder in the first degree, even if the
I;>
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evidence supported a verdict of guilty of murder in the
first degree. Her answers were ambiguous. Once she
said, "could be", ( T. 61) , once "possibly", once "I
don't think so", then she "guessed" she was confused,
and then answered "yes". As in PEOPLE V.
VAUGHN, supra, where the Court held that the possibility was left open that there were cases where the
death penalty could be invoked by the excluded venireman, so here the possibility is left open from these answers, that Mrs. Maass' attitude would prevent her from
impartially determining guilt. Certainly it was not made
"unmistakably clear" that she could not perform such a
function. As was said in PEOPLE V. WILLIAMS,
71 Cal. 2d 614, 79 Cal. Rptr. 614, 456 P 2d 633 (1969):
Whether an excluded prospective juror has
given an answer which constitutes the sort of
unambiguous and "unmistakably clear" statement of opposition to the death penalty, WITHERSPOOON requires depends upon whether
there is any reasonable possibility that the juror
construed the QUESTION to which he was
responding in such a manner as to render his
answer ambiguous in relation to the 'VITHERSPOON test - his willingness to at least consider the death penalty in the case before him.
456 P2d at 641.
It is certainly "reasonably possible", judging from
the voir dire examination, that the questions were ambiguous to Mrs. Maass and thus, her final answer appeared certain when her prior answers had been of the
opposite tenor to an affirmative answer to the question.
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This "reasonable possibility" must be seen in light of
CHAPJ.YIAN V. CALIFORNIA, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S
Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed 29 705 ( 1967), which held
that a federal constitutional error cannot be held
harmless unless the reviewing Court is convinced
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that it was harmless.
\VITHERSPOOX held that it is federal constitutional error to exclude a prospective juror in a potential death penalty case because of his reservations about
voting for that penalty unless he states unambiguously
that he would automatically vote against the imposition
of capital punishment, no matter what the trial court
might reveal [or that his attitude about capital punishment would prevent him from making an impartial decision as to guilt] ... \\Then a juror is excluded for cause
on the basis of an answer which is not phrased in these
terms, his exclusion should be considered erroneous and
grounds for reversal of the penalty determination, unless
it is clear "beyond a reasonable doubt" that this error
was harmless - i.e. clear "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that his answer could not be construed as meaning the
same thing as the answer in \VITHERSPOON reqmres.
PEOPLE V. WILLIAMS, SUPRA, 456 P.2d
at 641, fn. 2. Appellant contends that this Court cannot
say it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Maass'
answer meant the same as \VITHERSPOON requires
for her to be excluded, that is, that her attitude toward
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the death penalty would prevent her from making an
impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
It is not fatal to appellant's contentions that .Mrs.
Maass was the only prospective juror excluded because
of an attitude as to capital punishment. In California,
the rule is clearly that if even one venireman is excluded
for cause in violation of the 'VITHERSPOON rule, a
reversal of the penalty is required. The same rule has
been stated by other courts. In BEAN Y. STATE, 465
P .2d 133 (Nev. 1970) , the court said that if one or more
jurors are wrongly excused, the penalty feature of the
trial is destroyed. The same rule is stated in 'VOODARDS V. MAXWELL, 3D3 F. Supp. 690 ( S. D.
Ohio, 1969) and MARION V. BETO, 434 F. 2d 29
(5th Cir. 1970). This rule is justified because, as the
court said in MARION V. BETO, supra, due to the
weightiness of the subject matter, even one improperly
excluded juror may mean the difference between the
life and death of the defendant.

Appellant contends that because Mrs. Maass, a
prospective juror, was wrongly excluded for cause, he is
entitled to a reversal and a new trial to determine the
proper penalty.

POINT III
THE COURT BELO'V ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT 'VAS THE RESULT
20

OF AK ILLEGAL ARREST FOLLU\VED BY
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
Appellant was arrested at Dutch John, Utah, on
July 10, 1970, by Sheriff Fay Gillette, ( T. 535). Sheriff Gillette obtained the warrant of arrest from Tooele
City Judge, M. Earl .Marshall on July 10, 1970, after
signing a Complaint in the latter's presence, (T. 363,
504). Judge Marshall testified that on that date he issued a warrant of arrest, and that he swore Sheriff Gillette before he signed the Complaint, ( T. 504) . He did
not inquire about the facts in the Complaint, ( T. 505),
and he testified that it was not customary to engage in
conversation with a complaining witness, (T. 505), and
it was not his practice to ask questions, (T. 507). He
testified that he did not ask him any questions regarding
the information Sheriff Gillette had that appellant committed the crime complained of, (T. 507).
Bennett Belwood, the father of appellant, testified
that he was at the Sheriff's Office on July 10, 1970, at
about 2 :00 or 2 :30 p.m. and he overheard a conversation
over the two way radio, after a call came over the radio,
in which Sheriff Gillette stated to someone over the raido
that they should keep the red car they had spotted at
Flaming Gorge under surveillance, and that he, Sheriff
Gillette, didn't have any evidence as of yet, but he would
have it by the time he got there. Sheriff Gillette told
:.;omeonc over the radio to hold them as they were under
surveillance, 1:md there was no evidence yet, but they were
just suspects, ( T. 445-449). Sheriff Gillette denies such
a conversation, ( T. 501).
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After the warrant of arrest was served on July 10,
1970, and appellant was arrested, appellant's car was
seized and driven back to Tooele. There was no warrant
for seizing the car, (T. 202). After the car had been at
Tooele County Garage, behind the Tooele Courthouse,
for a couple of days, a search warrant was obtained and
appellant's car was searched, (214, 273). Appellant objected to the introduction of any evidence that resulted
from the seizure of the car and that resulted from the
search under the warrant, on the grounds that there was
not probable cause for the arrest and so the seizure of the
car was illegal, and also on the grounds that there was no
probable cause for the search warrant, (T. 207). Appellant moved to quash the search warrant and all evidence obtained under it, (T. 207). The evidence objected to consisted of pictures of tires of appellant's car (exhibits 5, 6, 7) ; the three tires themselves taken off appellant's car (Exhibits 34, 35, 36) ; pictures of scratches
on appellant's car taken at the impound garage in Tooele, (Exhibits 17, 20, 21-T. 214); debris taken from the
interior of appellant's car, (Exhibit 36) ; paint particles
scraped off appellant's car at the Tooele County Garage,
(Exhibit 39) ; twigs removed from the outside of appellant's car, and a .22 caliber shell from the inside of
appellant's car, (Exhibits 52, 41, 44, 45, 42). This evidence was all admitted over appellant's continuing objection.
The validity of the arrest in appellant's case is important because the seizure of the car was accomplished
without a warrant, and a search and seizure is presumed
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to be "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and
well delineated exceptions." COOLIDGE V. NE'V
HAlVIPSHIRE, -------- U.S. ________ , 91 S. Ct ......... , 29 L
Ed. 2d 546, 576 ( 1971). The only possible exceptions
to this general requirement of a search warrant would be
that this was a seizure incident to an arrest or that this
was another exigent circumstance because the thing
seized was an automobile.
There must be a showing by those who seek
exemption [from the general rule] . . . that the
exigencies of the situtaion made that course imperative ... The burden is on those seeking the
exemption to show the need for it. COOLIDGE
V. NE'V HAl\IPSHIRE, SUPRA, 29 L Ed
2d at 576.
To be a search or seizure incident to an arrest, there
must, of course, first be a valid arrest. UNITED
STATES V. RABINO\VITZ, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct.
430, 94 L.Ed. 653 ( 1950) . In Utah a police officer can
make an arrest in "obedience of a warrant" ... "when a
felony has in fact been committed, or he has reasonable
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed
it". 77-13-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
a verified complaint is made before a
magistrate, charging the commission of a crime
or public offense, he must, if satisfied therefrom
that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused committed it, issue a warrant for his arrest ... " 77-12-1, Utah Code Ann.,
(1953).
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What "reasonable course" or "reasonable ground"
is has been defined in the same terms as what is more
commonly called "probable cause". ALLEN V. LINDBECK, 97 Utah 421, 93 P.2d 920 (1939); STATE V.
LOPEZ, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451, P 2d 772 (1969). The
Supreme Court in BECK V. OHIO, 379 U.S. 89, 85
S. Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed. 2d 42 (1964), held that where there
was a search incident to a warrantless arrest.
The constitutional validity of the search must
depend on the constitutional validity of [the}
arrest. Whether that arrest was constitutionally
valid depends in turn whether, at the moment
the arrest was made, the officers had probable
cause to make it - whether at that moment the
facts and circumstances within their knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrapt a prudent
man in believing that [the arrestee] had committed ... an offense. 379 U.S. at 91.
Basically, this same thing is required to obtain an
arrest warrant. In GIORDENELLO V. UNITED
STATES, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d
1503 ( 1958), there was an arrest for the unlawful purchase of narcotics. The warrant was based on a complaint, which stated in substance only that the complainant swore that on a certain date, at a certain place, the
defendant received unlawfully narcotics in violation of a
certain federal statute. The defendant there challenged
the arrest as invalid and contended that the search or
seizure which was incident to the arrest was also invalid.
The Court held that the purpose of the complaint is to
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enable the magistrate to determine whether the probable
cause required to support a warrant exists.
He [the
must judge for himself
the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a
complaining officer to show probable cause ...
He should not accept without question the complainai;it's mere conclusion that the person whose
arrest is sought has committed a crime. 2 L.Ed.
2d at 1503.
The Court held that the complaint did not show that
the complainant spoke with personal knowledge, it did
not show the sources of his belief, and in short, there was
no basis upon which a finding of probable cause could be
made. Therefore, the Court held, the arrest was invalid
and the evidence seized should not have been admitted.
See also JABEN V. UNITED STATES, 281 U.S.
214, 85 S. Ct. 1365, 14 L Ed 2d 345 (1965), where the
Court retained the GIORDENELLO rule but found
probable cause had been shown. Both of these cases were
federal cases, and the Court in GIORDENELLO
based the result on Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, "in light of the Constitutional requirement''. However, in AGUILAR V. TEXAS, 378
U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 223 (1964), the
Court, 12 L Ed 2d at 727, fn. 3, said that the "principle
announced is GIORDENELLO derived, therefore,
from the Fourth Amendment and not from our supervisory power". Therefore, the Court said, that case (GIORDENELLO) guides the determination of probable
cause under the Fourth Amendment, which of course is
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binding on the States. For the same reasoning see
BECK V. OHIO, SUPRA, 13 L.Ed. 2d at 148, fn. 5.
This arrest warrant procedure is
to
that deliberate, impartial judgment of
a judicial officer will be interposed between the
citizen and the police, to assess the weight and
credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause.
'VONG SUN V. UNITED STATES, 371 U.S.
471, 83 S. Ct. 407 9 L Ed. 2d 441, 451 (1963). In PEOPLE V. SESSLIN, 68 Cal, 2d 418, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409,
439 P 2d 321 ( 1968), the defendant was arrested for

forgery and grand theft under a warrant that was based
on a nine page felony complaint. After the arrest, the
defendant gave writing exemplars which were instrumental in his conviction. The court, in a well reasoned
opinion cited GIORDENELLO, SUPRA, and AGUILAR, SUPRA, (a search warrant case) and held
that the two cases together mean that the complaining
officer, to obtain an arrest warrant, must state facts ( 1)
that if true, would directly indicate commission of the
crime charged or (2) that related to the source of the
directly incriminating information. The California court
held that as the handwriting exemplars came at the exploitation of the illegal arrest in this case, their admission
into evidence violated the Fourth Amendment and a reversal was required under WONG SUN V. UNITED
STATES, supra. WONG SUN said, that the question is whether the evidence to which objection has been
made came by the exploitation of illegality (an illegal

26

arrest there) or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be "purged of that primary taint". 371 "C.S.
at 488. The California court said there was no basis that
the writing exemplars given and the illegal arrest "became so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." This was
because there must be an intervening act by the defendant or some third person which "breaks the causal chain
linking the illegality and the evidence in such a way that
evidence is not in fact obtained by exploitation of that
illegality". For example, the court discussed consent by
the defendant to the giving of the exemplars. The court
found none and held the admission of the exemplars to
be prejudicial error requiring reversal.
In appellant's case, Sheriff Gillette was sworn by
Judge Marshall before signing the complaint, (T. 504).
There was no inquiry whatever as to the facts in the complaint that would indicate the commission of the crime
charged nor as to the source of the directly incriminating
information. Judge Marshall was not able "to judge for
himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by the
complaining officer to show probable cause". GIORDENELLO V. UNITED STATES, SUPRA. Judge
Marshall did exactly what the Supreme Court in GIORDENELLO said could not be done. "He should not
accept without question the complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is sought committed a
crime". 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1503. In both GIORDEXELLO
and PEOPLE Y. SESSLIN, supra, the practice in
appellant's case that was followed (couching the complaint in terms of the statute) was condemned. 'Vhether
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Sheriff Gillette knew some facts and circumstances is
totally irrelevant, as a reviewing court can consider only
information that was brought to the magistrate's attention. See, e.g., AGUILAR V. TEXAS, SUPRA, 12
L. Ed 2d at 725, fn. I.
Appellant contends that under the above cases his
arrest was based on an invalid arrest warrant obtained
without probable cause. Therefore, this illegal arrest
taints the seizure of appellant's car which followed his
invalid arrest and any evidence arising out of that seizure
was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
This is what WONG SUN, SUPRA, dictates, and in
the words of the court in that case, there clearly is no
showing that this evidence came by means "sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of that primary taint." 371
U.S. at 488. The seizure of appellant's car clearly came at
the exploitation of the illegality, the illegal arrest, as the
car was seized shortly after appellant was arrested. Appellant (nor any other third person) did nothing that
intervened in the causal chain between the arrest and the
soon to follow seizure. Therefore, under "\VONG SGN,
SUPRA, the seizure cannot be upheld on the basis of the
invalid arrest. If the seizure is to stand, it must be because there was independent
cause to seize appellant's car.
In CARROLL V. UNITED STATES, 267 U.S.
137, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L Ed 543 (1925) the Court distinguished the search and seizure of an automobile and
a home.

28

The measure of legality of such a seizure is,
therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable
probable cause for believing that the
automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. 267 U.S. at 155-156. The right to search
and the validity of the seizure are not dependent
on the right to arrest. They are dependent on
the reasonable cause of seizing off'icer has for the
belief that the contents of the automobile offend
against the law. 267 U.S. at 158-159. (emphasis
added)
From this, it is clear that when a car is stopped on a
highway, the same rules do not govern as goYern the
search and seizure in a house. However, in CARROLL
it was made clear that there must be independent probable cause to search and seize the car. If there is probable cause to search or seize the car, then it can be seized
without a warrant. This was made clear in CHAMBERS V. MARONEY, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975,
26 L Ed 2d 419 ( 1970) . There the police pulled over a
car. The police had probable cause to arrest, and they
had probable cause to believe that guns and recent items
taken in a recent robbery were in the car. Thus, the
Court held that given probable oause to search, either
searching the car without a warrant or seizing it and
holding it before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
There was probable cause for the arrest, and because of
the mobility of the car and the facts of the recent crime,
CHAMBERS held that the car could be searched without a warrant or seized, because there was probable cause
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to search. Where there is probable cause to arrest, it is
clear that a search or seizure of a vehicle on the highway
can be made. STATE V. CHESTNUT, 20 Utah 2d
268, 437 P.2d 197 (1968); STATE V. CRISCOLA,
21 UTAII 2d 277 444 P.2d 517 (1968). In appellant's
case there was, as discussed, no probable cause for the
arrest. Therefore, there must be shown by those who seek
an exemption to the general rule that a warrantless
search or seizure is "per se unreasonable", a need for that
exemption, they must show that the "exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative". COOLIDGE
V. NEW HAMPSHIRE, SUPRA. There was no
such showing by the state nor was there any showing
that there was any probable cause independent of the
illegal arrest. COOLIDGE answered the problem here.
In that case the defendant was arrested in his home. His
car, parked outside in his driveway, was seized without a
warrant and searched a few days later, again without a
warrant. The Court pointed out, in discussing the "plain
view" doctrine, that the police knew the description of
the car, knew where it was, and that it contained no contraband ' and so a warrant could have been easily
. obtained. In appellant's case, the same factors were known
by the police, and Sheriff Gillette had time to get an
arrest warrant so it would seem that a search warrant
could have been obtained also, if probable cause could
haYe been shown to a magistrate. In COOLIDGE, the
Court summed up the principle of the case as being,
that the police must obtain a warrant when they
intend to seize an object outside the scope of a
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valid search incident to arrest. 29 L. Ed. 2d at
593.
After the car was seized, a search warrant was obtained and appellant's car was searched and photographed and from this search evidence was introduced at
trial. Appellant contends that this evidence should not
have been introduced as it too came from an illegal source
in that it was at the exploitation of the illegal seizure and
the illegal arrest. Appellant also contends that, apart
from this taint of the illegality, the search warrant cannot be upheld even on its own merits as it was issued
without probable cause.
The same analysis as discussed above applies here
under the WONG SUN and SESSLIN cases, supra.
That is, there was here no intervening acts by anyone which separate the original illegal arrest and seizure
from the later search under the warrant. There would
have been no search had the car not been illegally seized
or had appellant not been illegally arrested in that the
car was already taken into custody when the affidavit
for a search warrant was made, which was on July I I,
1970, ( T. 508). The evidence turned up in the search
clearly was at the exploitation of the prior illegality and
was the friut of an illegal arrest. WONG SUN was a
federal prosecution, but is clearly binding on the states.
See the per curiam remand of TRAUB V. CONNECTICUT, 374 U.S. 493, 83 S. Ct. I899, IO L Ed 2d I048
(I968) in light of 'VONG SUN and KER V. CALIFORNIA, 324 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, IO L Ed 2d 726
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( 1963) . The "taint" had not worn off by the passage of
one day from the arrest until the search warrant was
obtained.
Even if the prior illegality were not sufficient to
also condemn the later search, the search warrant itself
obtained on July 11, 1970, was not obtained properly
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because
there was no probable cause for its issuance. It is clear
from SPINELLI V. UNITED STATES, 393 U.S.
410, 89 S. Ct. 589, 21 L Ed 2d 637 ( 1969) that the facts
of each case determine whether probable cause exists or
not. NATHANSON V. UNITED STATES, 290
U.S. 41, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 154 (1933) held that an
affirmation of suspicion or belief in the application for a
search warrant without any statement of supporting
facts is not such as to meet the probable cause requirement. Appellant contends that the search warrant obtained in appellant's case is invalid because the affidavit
in support of the search warrant was defective under the
early case of NATHAN SON, SUPRA. Judge Marshall
testified that Sheriff Gillette visted him in his home on
July 11, 1970, one day after the arrest and seizure of the
car, to obtain a search warrant, (T. 508). The judge reviewed the affidavit in support of the search warrant and
followed his normal practice of not asking any questions,
(T. 509). Therefore, the validity of the search warrant
must stand or fall, for Fourth Amendment purposes, on
what was contained in Seriff Gillette's affidavit in support of the search warrant. That affidavit (R. --------)
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speaks for itself, but in substance, it says, paragraph by
paragraph, as follows.
The first paragraph says that Sheriff Gillette has
probable cause to believe and does believe that a certain
described car is at the Tooele impound garage, and in
that vehicle are certain named articles of personal property.
The second paragraph says that Sheriff Gillette has
probable cause to believe and does believe that the named
property was used as a means of committing a felony or
was evidence which tended to show the commission of a
felony or that a particular person had committed a
felony. Sheriff Gillette in the affidavit then laid out what
he called, "facts in support of the issuance of the search
warrant" in the third paragraph. The first "fact" in the
fourth paragraph was that he had been a police officer
for 24 years and received and acted on the information
set forth in the affidavit.
The fifth paragraph stated that Sheriff Gillette has
for 24 years been on the investigation detail at the Tooele
Sheriff's Department. The next paragraph stated that
Sheriff Gillette, from personal investigation and from
other policemen, received information on July 9 and 10,
1970, that "persons suspected of the commission of a
felony" reside at a described address in Tooele; that they
were observed at their home shortly before and after the
commission of "said felony" and that the "persons suspected of commission of a felony" own the previously
described automobile; that those persons were observed
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in possession of that car at about the time the commission
of the felony occurred, and that physical evidence of
paint smears, tire tread and damage to that car "indicate" the car was at the scene of the crime. Paragraph
seven states that acting on information received, Sheriff
Gillette conducted further investigation; he had apprehended "said suspected persons" and taken the car into
custody. The eighth paragraph prayed that, because of
fear that the described property would become nonexistant through destruction or secretion, and for other
reasons in the affidavit, the property be seized as soon
as possible. The rest of the warrant simply describes the
time Sheriff Gillette prepared the affidavit, the prayer
for the search warrant, and that he had reasonable cause
to believe that grounds for the issuance of the search warrant existed, "based upon the aforementioned information, facts, and circumstances."
It is clear that this affidavit is lacking in what is
required to make out probable cause, even under NATHANSON, SUPRA, in that the whole tenor of the
affidavit was simply that Sheriff Gillette had "suspects"
and he "believed" the evidence sought would "indicate"
the commission of a felony by particular persons. The
affidavit was, as the Court in NATHANSON condemned, simply an affirmation of suspicion without supporting facts. Under later cases the affidavit is even
more clearly bad. In AGUILAR V. TEXAS, SUPRA,
the Court held that to obtain a search warrant, the magistrate must be shown facts ( 1) that if true, would directly indicate the commission of the crime charged or
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(2) that relate to the source of the directly incriminating
information. In that case the affidavit in support of the
search warrant stated that the affiant had reliable information from a credible person, and did believe that
drugs were being kept on certain premises for sale contrary to the law. The Court held that the same standard
was applicable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments and that this affidavit fell short of the twopronged test set out above. The Court said that a reviewing Court is to pay substantial deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause, but he is not to
be a "rubber stamp" for the police. "The informed and
deliberate determination of magistrates empowered to
issue warrants ... is to be preferred over the hurried
action of officers ... who may happen to make arrests.
12 L.Ed. 2d at 726, the Court said that the inferences
from the facts must be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate. Of course, as mentioned above, the reviewing
court can only consider the adequacy of the information
brought to the magistrate's attention. 12 L.Ed. 2d at
725, fn. I. The court cited GIORDENELLO, supra,
for the proposition that the magistrate should not
"accept the complainant's mere conclusion ... " Comparing the affidavit of Sheriff Gillette with those in AGUILAR, NATHANSON, and SPINELLI, supra,
and with the test set out in AGUILAR, it can be
seen that this affidavit was not sufficient to make out
probable cause. All it really said was that Sheriff Gillette had a car that he had seized (which, as argued
aboYe, taints the search that followed, but that argument
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is separate from this) which belonged to "suspects" that
he had apprehended and that there were things in that
car that he believed would "indicate" the commission of a
felony by those "suspects". It also stated such "facts" as
the people who were "suspects" owned the car seized and
were in possession of it at the time a felony ·was committed. Again, it was stated that some physical evidence
"indicated" that this car was at the scene of the crime.
None of these "facts" fell within the kind of "facts" that
AGUILAR requires, that is, facts that if true would
directly indicate the commission of the crime charged."
The affidavit standing alone did no more than state
an affirmation of suspicion, which NATHANSON held
defective, without sufficient underlying facts to indicate
to a reasonable and prudent man that an offense had
been committed and that appellant committed it. As
such, the search warrant that was issued is invalid and
those items of evidence seized under it were obtained in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
and so should not have been admitted at trial. Apart from
this argument that the search warrant itself was bad, appellant contends, as discussed first, that the arrest was
invalid and the seizure of the car was also invalid as accomplished without probable cause. Therefore, the later
search was tained by this prior illegality and so the evidence resulting from that search should not have been
admissable and the error was of such a prejudicial nature
as requires a reversal and a new trial.
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POINT III (A)
THE COURT BELU\V ERRED IX ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT WAS THE RESULT
OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH BECAUSE THE
SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT ISSUED IN
COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH LAW.
As mentioned in Point III, Judge Marshall testified that he issued a search warrant to Sheriff Gillette
after simply reviewing the affidavit in support of the
search warrant. He did not ask the Sheriff any questions
because that was not his practice. ( T. 509).
77-54-4, Utah Code Ann; ( 1953), states:
The magistrate must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complainant, and any
witnesses he may produce, and take their depositions in writing, and cause them to be subscribed
by the parties making them. (emphasis added)
From this statute dealing with the issuance of search
warrants it is clear that a magistrate must examine on
oath the complainant, as well as receive a written document, or the warrant is not properly issued. In STATE
V. JASSO, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P 2d 844 (1968), this
court held that a search warrant issued on the basis of a
written affidavit, supplemented by oral question, which
elicited further information, was improperly issued. In
that case the magistrate told the officer that the affidavit
alone was not sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant and so the officer was sworn and orally examined by
the magistrate. This elicited further information which
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the magistrate felt sufficient to make out probable cause
and so the warrant was issued on that basis. In reference
to the statute above quoted, 77-54-4, Utah Code Ann.,
( 1953) , this court held, 439 P 2d at 845 : '''\Te are of the
opinion that the warrant not having been issued pursuant
to the statute is invalid." Therefore, this court held that
the evidence seized under the warrant should not have
been admitted at trial and reversed the conviction.
Appellant contends that this reasoning applies in
his case. The statute clearly, without question, was not
followed in appellant's case and therefore the warrant
was not issued pursuant to the statute and so is invalid.
Therefore, as in JASSO, the evidence seized under the
invalid warrant should not have been admitted at trial
and a reversal of the conviction should follow.
Appellant objected to the admission of the evidence
obtained as a result of the search warrant, though not on
the specific grounds above. However, this is not fatal to
appellant's contention because this court has held on several occasions that to correct egregious and palpable
error of such critical importance, and in the interests of
justice, especially in capital cases, it may notice and correct such error even though no specific objection was
taken to the error. STATE V. COBO 90 Utah 89, 60
P. 2d 952 (1936); STATE V. NELSON 12 Utah 2d
177, 364 P. 2d 409 (1961); STATE V. SANCHEZ,
11 UTAH 2d 429, 361 P. 2d 174 (1961); STATE V.
POE, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512 (1968); STATE
V. SCHAD, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P. 2d 246 (1970). As

38

this is a capital case, and as appellant did object to the
admission of the evidence on the grounds that the search
warrant was invalid, appellant contends that this court
can review this assignment of error where the admission
of the evidence was prejudicial to appellant.
POINT IV
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADMITTING THE CONFESSION INTO EVIDENCE
BECAUSE IT WAS MADE WHILE APPELLANT WAS DETAINED UNDER AN ILLEGAL ARREST.
Appellant was arrested on July 10, 1970, and gave
a confession on July 12, 1970 (T. 363, 541-551). Appellant objected to the confession at trial that it was made
without a valid arrest. ( T. 182). Appellant contends that
as he was arrested illegally (See Point III discussion)
the confession given should have been excluded under
WONG SUN V. UNITED STATES, supra. In
'VONG SUN the court dealt with the confessions of
two defendants. Defendant Toy was illegally arrested by
six or seven federal narcotic agents. They broke down
the door of his laundry after he refused them admittance.
They followed him through his shop and into his bedroom, where he was arrested and where he made a statement that inculpated himself and implicated the defendant 'Vong Sun. Wong Sun was later arrested and then
released. He voluntarily returned later and confessed.
The court held that Toy's statement should have been
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excluded and 'Vong Sun's was rightly admitted. In so
holding the Court made some statements that have
caused the lower federal courts and state courts to adopt
divergent views. The court said:
The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred
from trial physical, tangible materials obtained
either during or as a direct result of unlawful
invasion. It follm,·s from our holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct.
679,, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961), that the Fourth
Amendment may protect against the overhearing
of verbal statements as well as against the more
traditional seizure of 'papers and effects'. Similarly, testimony as to matters observed during
an unlawful invasion has been excluded in order
to enforce the basic constitutional policies . . .
thus, verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as to the officers' action in the present
case is no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than
the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted invasion. 9 L Ed 2d at 454.
The court also said, 9 L Ed 2d at 454, that
the policies underlying the exclusionary rule
invite (no} logical distinction between physical
and verbal evidence. Either in terms of deferring lawless conduct by federal officers ... or
of closing the doors of
to any
use of evidence unconstitut10nally obtamed ...
the danger in relaxing the exclusionary rule in
the case of verbal evidence would seem too great
to warrant introducing such a distinction.
However, the court then said later that
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we need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the
poisonous tree' simply because it would not have
come to light for the illegal actions of the police.
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is
granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection
is made has been come at by the exploitation of
of instead by means sufficiently
d1stmgmshable to be purged of that primary taint.
9 L Ed 2d at 455.
The court also said, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 454, fn. 12, in
discussing the facts surrounding the arrest and confession of Toy, that "under such circumstances it is unreasonable to infer that Toy's response was sufficiently an
act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion". Thus, in reading the above quoted language, the courts have been able to find support for excluding a confession that came about during detention
under an illegal arrest and also for the opposite position,
that there must be special or "oppressive circumstances"
as in Toy's case for the confession to be excluded simply
because of the prior police illegality; that is, an illegal
arrest.
Thus, some courts use what could be called the
"deterrance" approach and other courts use what could
be called a "causation-voluntariness approach." This
court has held that an admission is admissable even
though the prior arrest was bad, because the facts of the
case were so far removed from "\VONG SUN that that
case was not applicable. STATE V. RIOJAS, 14 Utah
2d 79, 377 P. 2d 640 (1963). This court stated what is

41

basically the "causation-voluntariness" test, and seemingly the majority rule, in STATE V. HART, 15 Utah
2d 395, 393 P. 2d 487 (1966), when it held that, (where
there was not an illegal arrest as such but it was argued
that there was unreasonable delay in appearance before
a magistrate and thus the detention was illegal) , where
the confession was voluntary, it would not be rendered
inadmissable because it was obtained during this delay.
This was because the delay was not unreasonable but
even if it had been, there was no indication that such delay had some causative effect upon the giving of the
confession. See also STATE V. GARDNER, 119 Utah
579, 230 P. 2d 559 ( 1951) for the same basic rule. Other
courts have dealt with the precise problem at hand. That
is, assuming an illegal arrest, and a voluntary statement
preceded by the warning of rights, is that statement
rendered inadmissable by the fact that the accused is
under detainment by an illegal arrest? The test and the
reasoning are well stated in the following cases, which
are representative of this "causation-voluntariness" position, which seems to be numerically the majority position. In HOLLINGSWORTH V. UNITED
STATES, 321 F. 2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963), the court
said, at 350:
The fact that a confession was obtained from
him during his custody under an unlawful arrest
does not ipso facto make it involuntary and inadmissible, but the fact that a confession was
obtained during such custody and the attendant
circumstances should be considered in determining whether the confession was voluntary, but
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voluntariness still remains the test of admissability.
In STATE V. TRAUB, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d

755 ( 1962), the court reasoned as follows:

. . . where a detention is illegal, a confession
made during such detention cannot be admitted
unless and until the state proves that ( 1) the
confession was truly voluntary and ( 2) it was
not caused or brought about by, or the fruit of,
the illegal detention. It is the second, the causative factor, which Wong Sun added to the voluntariness requirement. If the detention is illegal,
then it must be eliminated as an operative factor.
For cases following this basic rule, see STATE V.
MOORE, 275 N.C. 141, 166 S. E. 2d 53 (1969) and
cases cited therein.
Other courts reason that the only way to deter police
misconduct is to use the "deferrance" test and exclude a
statement because of the illegal arrest, apart from its voluntariness or the causative factors involved in the illegal
arrest. These courts rely on the language above quoted
in W 0 NG SUN dealing with the analogy of physical
and verbal evidence and the need to exclude both "to enforce the basic constitutional policies." Also relied on is
the basic rationale of the Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary rule as stated in, for example, TERRY V.
OHIO, 392 U.S. l, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968):
The rule excluding evidence [obtained} in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recog-
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as a principal mode of discouraging lawless
conduct ... experience has taught that it
is the only effective deterrant to police misconduct
in the criminal context. 392 U.S. at 12.
That is, it is constitutionally impermissable for
police to arrest without probable cause. As such conduct
is constitutionally forbidden, to admit a confession obtained thereunder is to condone and even sanction such
conduct. By allowing this, "investigative" arrests will
be approved. Examples of courts that follow this "deterrance" test include Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d
666 (D.C. Cir. 1963; United States v. Morrese, 336
F.2d 501 (3rd Cir. 1964); Commonwealth v. Young,
349 Mass. 175, 206 N.E.2d 694 (1965); State v. Thompson, 1 Ohio App. 2d 533, 206 N.E.2d 5 (1965); State
v. Mercurio, 96 R.I. 464, 194 A.2d 574 (1963); Lyons
v. United States, 221 A.2d 711 (D.C. 1966). These
courts hold a statement inadmissable, even though
voluntary, if obtained as a result (that is, during illegal
detention) of an illegal arrest.
Persuasive argument has been made that the court
in Wong Sun did not intend to extend the ruling only
to cases of "oppressive circumstances". Professor Dale
Broedder, in "Wong Sun v. United States: A study in
Faith and Hope," 42 Nebraska L.R. 483, argues that
where the Court in Wong Sun stated that Toy's confession was to be excluded because of the oppressive
circumstances (9 L.Ed2d at 454, fn. 12) in that case,
it also cited the McNabb-Mallory rule to support the extension of the Silverman case, supra, to cover oral in-
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criminations. The McNabb-Mallory rule (which will
be discussed further in Point IV (A), infra) is a rule
that requires exclusion of evidence because of delay
in taking an accused before a magistrate. That rule,
however, requires exclusion whatever the circumstances ,
whether they be oppressive or not, and so Professor
Broedder argues that by supporting the extension of
the "fruits" doctrine .to oral incriminations with that
rule, the Court did not mean to imply that there must
be "oppressive circumstances" for the statement following the illegal arrest to be excluded. He argues that,
as the Court pointed out in Wong Sun, that Wong Sun's
confession was not excluded because there had been
sufficient attenuation to purge the primary taint, because Wong Sun had been released and then voluntarily
returned and confessed. Professor Broedder points out
that that is why 'Vong Sun's confession was not excluded and it was not because there were no "oppressive
circumstances" in his case. Other arguments are advanced to support this same position. See 42 N eh. L.R.
483 generally.
Appellant contends that this is the rule that ought
to be followed under Wong Sun because of the policies
behind the exclusionary rule. Therefore, assuming a
voluntary confession and an adequate warning of rights,
the illegal arrest in appellant's case requires that the
confession given while under this illegal detention should
have been excluded.

If this rule is deemed too harsh appellant contends

45

that the rule proposed by the American Law Institute
in the Proposed _Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (tentative draft no. 1 1966) be adopted. This
rule is designed to fit into the middle ground of the two
"rules" or "tests" discussed above. The rule would halt
flagrant violations by police and at the same time alleviate some of the harshness of the exclusionary rule.
The rule is set out in the A.L.I. Code, §902:

If a law enforcement officer, acting without a
warrant, arrests a person without reasonable
cause ... and the court determines that such arrest
was made without a fair basis for the belief that
such cause existed, no statetment made by such
person after such arrest and prior to his release,
unless it is made in the presence of or upon consultation with counsel, shall be admitted in evidence against such a person in a criminal proceeding in which he is the defendant.
The notes to this section, A.L.I. Code, p. 65, state that
the rule is to halt "investigative arrests". The rule, as
proposed, states that if the officer arrests "without a
warrant" the rule is to be invoked. However, it is clear
that an arrest without probable cause, even if under
a warrant, is just as constitutionally impermissable as
an arrest without a warrant without probable cause.
Thus, this rule would apply to appellant's case. The
statement is to be excluded unless given under the
advice of or in the presence of counsel. The rule only
applies where the arrest is made without reasonable
(probable) cause. Thus, this rule allows slight room for
error by the police without excluding any statements.
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It also halts flagrant abuses by police by excluding statements (without counsel) that follows an invalid arrest
without basis for belief that there is probable cause.
Appellant contends that this rule comes closer to
what the Court in Wong Sun intended than does the
"causation-voluntariness" rule and should be followed
if the "deterrance" rule is not. Under either the A.L.I.
proposed rule or the "deterrance" rule, appellant's confession should be excluded. Under the "causationvoluntariness" rule, the same result should follow because appellant contends the confession was not voluntarily given. See point IV (A), infra.
POINT IV (A)
THE COURT BELO'V ERRED IN ADMITTING APPELLANT'S CONFESSION BECAUSE IT \VAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A
RATIONAL INTELLECT AND A FREE
WILL.
Appellant was arrested on July 10, 1970, at about
5 :30 p.m. ( T. 363). The confession was given July 12,
1970, at about 3:00 p.m. (T. 369, 381). In that time,

appellant had been brought back to Tooele from the
place of arrest and had been in the Tooele City Jail
( T. 382). Sheriff Fay Gillette testified that he advised
appellant under Miranda at the time of his arrest (T.
368). On July 12, 1970, in his office, appellant was
brought in with Ruth Breece and he said he wanted
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to make a statement. Sheriff Gillette told appellant he
did not want him to talk, and that he had a right to an
attorney ( T. 370). Appellant was readvised under
Miranda (T. 370) after stating that he did not want
an attorney because he did not trust them and all they
did was "take your money" ( T. 370) . Sheriff Gillette
asked if he understood his rights and appellant said
he did, that he wanted to talk (T. 371). Present was
Ruth Breece, appellant, Sheriff Gillette, Dolores Doughtery and Deputy James Park ( T. 332). Appellant
testified that he took valium pills four times a day and
had done so for 21/2 to 3 years ( T. 457). He testified
he had one right after he was arrested ( T. 457). Sheriff
Gillette seized the pills appellant had when he was
arrested ( T. 383) . Appellant got a pill on July 11,
1970, at about 11 :00 a.m. or so (T. 384, 404) so he had
been in custody about 17 hours before he got his first
pill. The prescription called for a pill every three to
four hours ( T. 403) .
Appellant testified he got the pills on the nth but
got them after he made a statement (T. 458, 463).
Sheriff Gillette gave orders to the night jailer to give
appellant his pills according to the prescription but
did not know when appellant got the next pill after
July 11, 1970, at about 11:00 a.m. or noon (T. 404).
Sheriff Gillette did not know if appellant had any visitors
in the Tooele jail or not (T. 395) but he thinks appel..,
lant' s father visited him. Appellant was not allowed
any phone calls on July 11, 1970, by Sheriff Gillette
to his knowledge ( T. 396) but did call his father on
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July 12, 1970 ( T. 396). Appellant saw Ruth Breece
on July 12, 1970, at about 3 :00 p.m. After she had given
a statement, (T. 414, 415) appellant was brought in
with Ruth Breece, they talked, and appellant said he
wanted to make a statement ( T. 416) . Appellant was
arraigned on :Monday, July 13, 1970, before Judge
Marshall (T. 507). On July 11, 1970, Sheriff Gillette
met with Judge Marshall to procure a search warrant
( T. 508). After this evidence was before the Court,
out of the presence of the jury, appellant moved that
the confession not be admitted because it was not voluntarily given due to the protracted period of time
before arrest and confession; the lack of speedy arraignment, the presence of the drug problem, the lack of
probable cause for the arrest and the totality of the
circumstances ( T. 531) . The court ruled the confession
was voluntarily given and made findings in accord
with the State's motion (T. 532, 533). Appellant excepted to these findings ( T. 533) .
The rule is clear that for a confession to be admitted, it must be shown to be voluntary and the Court
is to consider the totality of the circumstances and the
court must act on all the evidence bearing thereon.
State vs. Strohm, 23 Utah 2d, 37, 456 P.2d 170 (1969);
State vs. Mares, 113 Utah 223, 192 P.2d 861 (1948);
Billings vs. People, 466 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1970); Baker
vs. State, 204 Kan. 607, 464 P.2d 212 (1970). It is
immaterial if the facts related to a confession appear
to be true, and it is not controlling that the statement
is coherent and rational, if other evidence establishes
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that it was not the product of a "rational intellect and
a free will". People vs. MacPherson, 84 Cal. Rptr,
124, 465 P.2d 17 (1970) quoting Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199, 80 S. Ct. 279, L.Ed.2d 242 (1960).
A confession to be free and voluntary must have

been obtained without any direct or implied promises,
however slight". State vs. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 439
P2d 805 ( 1968) . In McFall, the defendant was a narcotic user. He asked for narcotics when he was arrested
and was told by the officers that the matter would be
"discussed after we have taken care of the business
at hand, going through the search and their asking questions of me." The court ruled the statement given to
be involuntary because the insinuation was that the
request for narcotics would be considered later. The
police should have told the defendant plainly and unequivocally that they would not give him any drugs
taken from him at arrest. The Court said that the defendant had some hope of receiving drugs if he cooperated and this was enough to render the confession
inadmissable. Other courts have ruled that where an
accused person is on some form of medication great care
must be used in ascertaining a confession. In Pea v.
United States, 397 F.2d 627, (D.C. Cir. 1968) the Court
said, at page 634:
The makeup of a free man includes his mechanisms for self-protection, to refrain from speech
that might endanger him. If he does speak out
his statement is admissable as the reflection of
free will, if his self-preservation mechanism
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to silence is overriden by pressure,
his owi;i. personality, by his own conscience,
feelmg, sense of duty, etc. But his
Judgment does not reflect his own free will or
inteHect if his statement is attributable in critical
to the fact that his self-protective mechamsm is negated or overriden by external force
or fraud, a condition of insanity, the compulsion
of drugs.
In Pea, the defendant had a self-inflicted head
wound, made a statement in normal, coherent tones,
there was no evidence of pain, but on the above quoted
reasoning the court held the statement inadmissable.
People v. Johmon, 74 Cal. Rptr. 889, 450 P2d 265
( 1968), held that it is not "the bare language of the
inducement but the nature of the benefit to be derived
by a defendant if he speaks the truth that has been
held to distinguish permissable and impermissable conduct." Appellant contended that he was promised he
could have the pills he needed if he would cooperate
( T. 462) but even discounting this and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, appellant should have had four pills per day and between
his arrest on July 10, 1970, at 5 :30 p.m. and the confession on July 12, 1970, at 3 :00 p.m. the Sheriff could
only say that appellant got one valium pill, when he
should have had, per prescription, probably at least
six or seven in that time. Taken alone, this might appear
innocuous, but considered in light of the other circumstances to be discussed, appellant could have believed
that he could get his medication if he spoke up, and
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this would not be a statement given by his free will,
but one dictated by a desire for his medication.
Other factors add to this atmosphere of involuntariness in their totality. In II National Legal Aid
and Def enders Association, Defenders News Letter
No. 5 (Sept. 1965) the appendix (pp. 5-11 lists the
factors that have been considered important in 36 Supreme Court cases dealing with the voluntariness of
confessions. Those listed included: ( 1) denial of rights,
( 2) type of questions, (3) threats, ( 4) status of the
accused (age, intelligence, education, sanity, health),
( 5) nature of coercion, ( 6) special techniques employed,
( 7) previous experience with police.
In appellant's case, in addition to the drug problem
discussed, there exists the fact of appellant's status.
Without reviewing all of the psychiatric testimony,
it was clear that appallant was of subnormal intelligence.
Psychologist Robert Card administered a battery of
tests and found appellant's I-Q to be overall on the
borderline level, but within the mental defective range
in reasoning ability ( T. 598). Louis Moench testified
that appellant was of average intelligence, but this was
not based on any tests, but merely based on talks with
appellant (T. 649). While the defense of insanity was
not accepted by the jury, there clearly was much evidence that appellant had mental difficulties, in that he
had been in mental institutions ( T. 555) , had attempted
suicide when his wife refused to come back to him (T.
631) , and so on. This testimony and evidence made it
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clear that appellant was not a strong-willed individual
(for example, he would cry when the odds were against
him, he stated in a psychological test ( T. 602)) and
that it would not take very much to overcome his will.
As a result, these factors and others may easily have
made the confession not the product of a free will and
rational intellect. The protracted time alone under the
federal rule would be enough to render the confession
inadmissable. Under the McNabb v. Mallory rule
(Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356,
I L.Ed.2d 1479 [1957}); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1942),
and Rule 5, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18
U.S.C.A., a person arrested must be taken without
unnecessary delay before a magistrate. If he is not,
any statements given cannot be admitted. Congress
had said in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act, (18 U.S.C. 3501 (c), that six hours is a reasonable
time to get an accused before a magistrate, provided
that time is not affected by reasonable travel time in
getting the accused to a magistrate. While the McNabbMallory rule and §3501 (c) are clearly not binding
on the states, and are clearly only federal rules, they
do show that the federal courts and Congress deem
the time one spends after an arrest and before arraignment as important factors, and if that time is too protracted those federal bodies have decreed that there
'
is too much possibility of coercion and so statements
given after that reasonable time will not be admitted.
Appellant contends that the protracted time before
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his arraignment, considering that Sheriff Gillette could
meet with Judge Marshall on July 11, 1970, to obtain
a search warrant, when added to the other factors discussed, make the totality of the circumstances such that
appellant's confession was not shown to have been voluntarily given, despite the waiver of rights which appears on the record. This is because the circumstances
made it such that his free will and rational intellect were
not operating because of the circumstances above
enumerated.
When a confession is admitted that should not
have been, it is so prejudicial per se, that reversal is
required. People v. Randall, 83 Cal. Rptr. 58, 464 P.2d
114 (1970) citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84
S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). This is because,
as Jackson v. Denno, supra, said, important human
values are sacrificed when an agency of the government
in the course of securing a conviction, gets a confession
out of an accused against his will.

POINT V
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ALLOWING PART OF THE CONFESSION APPELLANT MADE TO BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AND ALLOWING THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY TO REFER TO THOSE PARTS
IN HIS OPENING AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS BECAUSE PARTS OF THE CONFES-
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SION 'VERE PREJUDICIAL AND NOT PROBATIVE OF ANY FACT IN ISSUE.
The District Attorney in his opening statement
referred to the confession that appellant made, over
objection that it had not been shown that the confession
would be admissable (T. 110). In the opening statement, the District Attorney referred to parts of the
confessoin that were not probative, but were merely
prejudicial to appellant. The District Attorney stated
that he would show that appellant at the time of the
killing and at the time the confession was given had
a hate for the whole world and that he would have
killed anybody. He stated that appellant said that if
Sheriff Gillette gave him a gun, he would shoot the
Sheriff also (T. 111, 112). Appellant objected that this
was not probative, but prejudicial.
At the trial, the entire confession as given to Delores
Dougherty was read by Mrs. Dougherty ( T. 546-551).
This included not only the events that led up to the
shooting, but also included matters that were not relevant to the facts of the case nor to appellant's intent.
It included the part that appellant said he would have
had to take care of Ruth Breece if she had not agreed
to kill Ron Smith ( T. 549) . It also included the part
where appellant said he would kill Sheriff Gillette if
he would give him his gun, and go to the hills with him
(T. 551). Also, the part about wanting to shoot and
bury one Ron Stanley was included in the statement
that was read to the jury (T. 551).
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In the closing argument, the District Attorney
also included the part about getting rid of Ruth Breece
if she had refused to cooperate ( T. 686) .
Appellant had objected (T. 542) to certain aspects
of the confession being introduced at trial because they
were prejudicial and not probative. The objection w;s
overruled ( T. 545) and the statement in its entirety
was allowed into evidence. (Exhibit 55, T. 553) .
Appellant contends that while the state of mind of
appellant was no doubt important at the time of the
shooting, there was much in the statement by appellant
that was not relevant or probative as to his state of
mind nor as to any other issue in the case and as such,
the irrelevant and prejudicial aspects should not have
been admitted into evidence nor put before the jury
in the opening statement or in the summation.
Appellant does not contend that those aspects of
the confession that show his state of mind at the time
of the incident and prior thereto should have been excluded, even though prejudicial. For example, the parts
about talking about killing Ron, talking about Bonnie
and Clyde, and talk of killing someone for months ( T.
549) could be considered to bear on appellant's state
of mind prior to the killing. However, the parts mentioned above about killing Ruth also (T. 549) and
killing Sheriff Gillette and Ron Stanley and others
on a "long list" ( T. 551) all occurred several days
after the shooting and could not be probative of what
his state of mind was at the time of the shooting.
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"The basic rule of admissability of evidence is that
all evidence having probative value-that in, that tends
to prove an issue, is admissable". State v. Scott, 111 Utah
9, 175 P2d 1016 (1947). A confession is merely an
admission of guilt by the defendant of all the necessary
elements of the crime, including the necessary acts and
intent. State v. Masato-Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126
P .2d 1047 ( 1942). Thus, to be admissable, a confession
must, among other things, be an admission of an
element of the crime, be it of an act or the intent. Further, where a confession is used as evidence, the exclusion of part of the confession is error unless the excluded
part is immaterial or irrelevant and does not explain
or relate to the admitted portion. People v. Crowl, 28
Cal. App.2d 299, 82 P .2d 507 ( 1938). Thus, those
parts of a confession that are irrelevant and immaterial
and do not explain the other portions can be left out.
Appellant contends that this is what should have been
done.
The introduction of prejudicial aspects of a confession can be likened to the introduction of anything that
is prejudicial. For example, photographs. The same
rationale as to the effect of prejudicial evidence would
seem to apply whether that evidence be photographs
or a confession. Indeed, the reasons to exclude the latter,
if prejudicial, would seem to be even greater than the
reasons for excluding prejudicial photographs. This
is because when some pieces of evidence is claimed to
be prejudicial, its inflammatory nature must outweigh
its probative value with respect to a fact in issue. See,
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e.g., State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512
(1968); People v. Hines, 33 Cal. Rptr. 622, 390 P2d
398 ( 1964). Even a photograph that is prejudicial
likely will almost always have some probative value in
showing some physical aspect of the case. However,
with a confession, a part that is prejudicial will not
likely be relevant or probative of anything because it
will describe something that is not a physical piece of
evidence. However, assuming that prejudicial evidence
must be tested by the same rule, whether it be a photograph or a confession, it can be seen in appellant's case
that the mentioned parts of the confession, when their
inflammatory nature is weighed against their probative
value with respect to an issue in the case, should not
have been admitted. In Poe, supra, color slides were
the evidence that was held to be more prejudicial than
probative. This court said that the slides had no probative value because the only evidence that could be
adduced by seeing the slides had already been established by competent, uncontradicted testimony. The
slides were at least concerned with a fact in that case,
that is, the victim. In appellant's case, the prejudicial
aspects do not ever relate to what was otherwise shown
by other evidence or other parts of the confession. The
prejudical parts referred to do not even relate to an
issue at trial, but relate to appellant's general state of
mind and general feelings four days after the crime
occurred.
This court further said in Poe, supra, that the purpose of introducing the color slides in that case was so
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that the jury would not recommend leniency in that
case, which they didn't do. 'Vith the defendant's life at
stake, this court would not hazard a guess as to whether
the jury would have returned the same Yerdict had
it not seen the color slides. The slides could have very
well tipped the scales in favor of the death penalty, the
court further stated. Appellant contends that the same
result could have occurred in his case, and that the
highly prejudiical aspects of the mentioned parts of
the confession could have caused the jury to vote in farnr
of no recommendation of leniency. With his life at stake
also, appellant contends that this court cannot hazard
a guess that the result would have been the same had
these parts of the confession been excluded.
The error was magnified by the fact that in the
opening statement and in summation, the prejudicial
parts were referred to by the District Attorney. This
was a cumulative effect because the jury heard it several
times, as well as had the confession with them in written
form (Exhibit 55). This court has held that

•.
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The purpose of an opening statement is to advise
the jury of the facts relied upon and of the questions and issues involved, and to give them a general picture of the facts and the
so
that they will be able to understand the evidence.
Counsel should outline generally what he intends
to prove and should be allowed considerable latitude. He should make a fair statement of the
evidence and the extent to which he may go is
largely {n the discretion of the trial court. He
should not make a statement of any facts which
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he cannot legally prove upon the trial. State v.
Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P2d 295, 313 (1941).
Thus, appellant contends that as certain parts of the
confession should not have been admitted at the trial,
it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow
the District Attorney to refer to such evidence in his
opening statement. This error was merely cumulative
of the error at trial and served to make the parts of the
confession mentioned even more prejudicial. Because
of this, appellant is entitled to a reversal because this
court cannot say that the penalty invoked by the jury
would not have been different than it was if the evidence
had been excluded.
POINT VI
THE COURT BELOW ERRED 'VHEN IT
ALLOWED
EVIDENCE OF
ANOTHER
CRIME UNRELATED TO THE CHARGE AT
TRIAL TO BE ADMITTED.
One of the State's witnesses testified that on July
1, 1970, appellant and a young lady entered his store
and wanted to purchase a gun (T. 105). He testified
that appellant said "I've served time" and "I got a rec·
ord". (T. 105). Appellant moved that this be stricken.
In the proffer of proof, made outside of the hearing of
the jury, the District Attorney argued that this was
admissab1e because it explained why the gun used in
the shooting was not in appellant's name, but in Ruth
Breece's (T. 166). The court overruled appellant's

60

:·

LS

n

h

:'s

objection (T. 122) and the witness was allowed to
testify that when appellant tried to purchase the gun
on July 1, 197'0, he stated "I have a felony against me"
so "can I purchase the gun" ( T. I 74 Therefore, the
gun was sold to Ruth Breece because appellant could
not purchase the gun because of his record.
The clearest statement of the law concerning the
admissability of evidence of other crimes is found in
State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P2d 772, 775
(1969) :
Evidence of other crimes is n.ot admissable .if
the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a
person of evil character with a propensity to
commit crime and thus likely to have committed
the crime charged. However, if the evidence has
relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant crime, it is admissable for that purpose, and the fact that it may lead to connect
the defendant with another crime will not render
it incompetent. Such harm as there may be in
receiving evidence concerning another crime is
to be weighed against the necessity of full inquiry
into the facts relating to the issues.
See also for the same rule, State v. Johnson, 25 Utah
2d 160, 428 P.2d 401 (1970); State v. Gillian, 23 Utah
2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Scott, I l l Utah
9, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947).
Appellant contends that this evidence that appellant
had a "felony against [him]" does not explain any circumstances surrounding the crime charged. It \YUS not
necessary to show that appellant had a felony to show
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why the gun purchased was in the name of Ruth Breece.
It could have been merely shown that appellant and
Ruth Breece entered the witness' store and bought a
gun in her name. In a murder prosecution, one of the
issues is clearly not whose name the gun that killed
the deceased was in. It would have been enough to show
that appellant was with Ruth Breece when the gun was
bought. This evidence did not explain any "facts relating to the issues" (Lopez, supra) because it was not
an issue whose name the gun was in. The reasons it was
in Ruth Breece's name were not an issue in a murder
It was not necessary, as the District Attorney said in his argument ( T. 172) to show that
appellant purchased the gun in truth and in fact. It
can only be concluded that the evidence was put in for
its prejudical effect to make appellant look like a man
of evil character with a propensity to commit crime
and thus likely to have committed this one. Concerning
this type of evidence, evidence of other crimes, the
court has said that it is apt to be given "undue weight".
State v. Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 279 P.2d 914, 917
(1955).
In a case such as appellant's, where each piece of
prejudicial evidence could have been magnified in the
jury's mind and could have influenced their decision
as to whether to recommend leniency, appellant submits
that the introduction of such testimony was error which
requires a reversal and a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the appellant did not receive a fair
trial consistent with concepts of due process because of
the exclusion of sympathetic veniremen, the admission
into evidence of inflammatory and prejudicial statements, which statements, along with the physical evidence were obtained contrary to law. In addition, the
defendant was compelled over continuing objection in
violation of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to
be subjected to cross examination. Because of the cumulative effect of the points relied upon by appellant, it is
urged that appellant be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT VAN SCRIVER
321 South 6th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
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